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Vertical coordination is a significant problem in many if not most countries. These problems are 
exacerbated in policy implementation related to issues that cut across jurisdictional borders. 
This paper compares policy implementation in the field of climate change, a quintessential 
example of such cross-cutting issues. In the context of CO2 emissions reduction policies, the 
Peter Parker principle states that vertical coordination presupposes not just central govern-
ment control but also its responsibility. Our contribution to that argument is that the divorce 
between regulatory authority and formal jurisdiction challenges the principle. The present pa-
per studies how these issues play out in two different types of institutional contexts; those of 
Germany and Sweden. 
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Introduction
This paper explores the complexities of vertical coordination of the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions, the main cause of climate change, in Germany and Sweden. These complexities 
stem from a combination of autonomous agents, information and resource asymmetries, and 
an extraordinarily “wicked” policy problem. Much of our attention on policy coordination so 
far has been directed at horizontal policy coordination (see, for instance, Peters, 2015, 2018). 
We will argue that vertical policy coordination—aligning central government programs with 
those of autonomous regions and local authorities—poses an equally complex challenge as 
coordinating agencies, NGOs and societal actors, if not only more so. The significance of insti-
tutional values is particularly important in central-local relations where norms of subnation-
al autonomy and self-government raise constitutional barriers to coordination. In addition, 
member states of the European Union (EU) must also factor in the EU’s programs and direc-
tives into their domestic policy making, adding further institutional complexity and vertical 
coordination challenges.
We have found that although formal, institutional constraints prevent the federal/central gov-
ernment from relying on a strict top-down method of coordination, actors on all institutional 
levels strategically explore ways to reduce asymmetries between formal authority and resourc-
es. Moreover, the EU and the federal/central government achieve some degree of coordination 
by relying less on coercive instruments and more on incentives, thus circumventing constitu-
tional obstacles to control cities and regions. Thus, with only minor exaggeration would we say 
that in both countries there is fair degree of vertical policy coordination, not because of the 
formal institutional arrangements but despite them.
Public policy making and implementation reflect a complex blend of ideas, objectives and values 
embedded in institutional arrangements, political and administrative agency, and professional 
norms shaping government action. Policies and programs addressing different issues related 
to climate change are no exceptions to this pattern. The policy problem is often described as 
the quintessential “wicked problem” (Head and Alford, 2015; FitzGibbon and Mensah, 2012); 
indeed, the potential impact of full-scale climate change would have a major impact on society 
and the economy. At the same time, public policy to mitigate climate change is frequently re-
sisted by social groups such as private industry and farmers and their political representatives.
One particularly vexing issue is derived from the complex institutional arrangement within 
which climate change programs are embedded. In many countries, central government con-
trols regulatory instruments and financial resources while subnational government, by virtue 
of constitutional norms of local autonomy, own many of the specific policy issues that are part 
of the climate change policy cluster (Linander, 2019; Meadowcroft, 2007). Thus, institutional 
and financial leverage is essentially divorced from issue ownership; while member-state gov-
ernments have the financial means and expertise required to design and fund policy towards 
reducing greenhouse emissions, they lack formal authority over autonomous cities, where the 
bulk of greenhouse emissions occur and where targeted measures should be implemented. Cit-
ies, on the other hand, have such authority but often lack the necessary resources and know-
how to design and implement appropriate programs to reduce greenhouse emissions. Coupled 
with the increasingly active role of the EU in the environmental policy field, this disjuncture 
has propelled the emergence of complex multilevel governance arrangements seeking to align 
jurisdiction with institutional and financial capabilities across different institutional levels. 
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This complex institutional context and its apparent inability to comprehensively address sali-
ent policy challenges has brought back central-local relationships onto the political agenda in 
many countries. In Sweden, for instance, the partially failed or insufficient response to the 
recent COVID-19 pandemic has to a large extent been attributed to problems associated with 
the vertical coordination of decentralized healthcare and elderly care systems (Pierre, 2020). It 
is thus no coincidence that Sweden, over the past decade, has witnessed a marked increase in 
both the range and the specification of central government’s steering and control efforts over 
subnational government (Statskontoret, 2019a, b). Some of this increasing control may well 
have political motives although a good part may also simply be a matter of boosting vertical 
policy coordination.
Germany offers an even more complex case, one where local government enjoys extensive au-
tonomy vis-à-vis higher echelons of government, but where the Länder interact both with the 
federal government and with cities. The specific nature of these institutional relationships var-
ies considerably across different policy sectors.
The Peter Parker Principle, named after the action movie hero Spider Man, states that “with 
great powers come great responsibilities.” This principle is fundamental to constitutional de-
sign where authority is linked to accountability. In the present context, the principle states 
that vertical coordination presupposes not just central government control but also its respon-
sibility. Our contribution to that argument is that the divorce between regulatory authority 
and formal jurisdiction challenges this fundamental principle. Thus, unlike horizontal policy 
coordination, vertical policy coordination in political systems with constitutionally guaranteed 
local and regional autonomy frequently tends to challenge or even violate that principle. 
Our study draws on Most Different Systems Design (MDSD), where cases ideally differ on all 
relevant aspects except for the key dependent variable, which in our study is vertical policy 
coordination (Peters, 1998; Przeworski and Teune, 1970; see also Przeworski, 1987). In this 
design, we have conducted a comparative case study project observing vertical policy coordina-
tion in two different institutional frameworks: a federal state and a unitary state. The MDSD 
approach is the preferred research design, allowing as it does for vast differences in independ-
ent variables and where similarities are found at the sub-system level (Przeworski and Teune, 
1970). Embedded in these two differently organized states, there are important similarities, 
such as the autonomy of cities, which have a significant impact on policy implementation and 
local initiatives. This distinction facilitates an analysis of different multilevel governance ar-
rangements in the greenhouse emissions policy sector in two different political systems.
The methodology used in the paper is a qualitative method based on, and synthesizing, previ-
ous research. There are several studies on how cities and regions seek to tackle greenhouse 
emissions and to develop green technologies for transport, district heating and heat storage 
and similar projects. 
The next section of the paper reviews the institutional organization and coordination of cli-
mate change policy. We then turn to a brief outline of the basic tenets of multilevel governance 
theory before we introduce and compare processes of vertical policy coordination in the two 
countries. A concluding discussion wraps up the paper. 
Institutional politics and issue ownership in climate change policy
A major governance challenge associated with climate change is that while global challenges 
call for global solutions, the source of much of what causes climate change is found in the grow-
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ing cities of the world. Thus, cities are part of both the problem and the solution: “Cities are the 
locations where most of the (un)sustainability issues find their origin. At the same time, cities 
are the basic units for policies that have significant environmentally beneficial consequences 
(both local and global) [...]” (Nevens et al., 2013:111). Some (see for instance Hammer et al., 
2011:34) emphasize the economic opportunities that the development of green technologies 
has to offer cities: “The greening of the traditional urban economy and expanding the green 
urban sector can generate growth (through increased supply and demand), job creation and 
increased urban attractiveness. These effects are in part the result of stronger interactions at 
the urban level among economic efficiency, equity and environmental objectives.”
Cities play a major role in causing climate change, particularly greenhouse gas emissions. To-
day, cities account for 70 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions. It is estimated that in 2050, 
75 percent of the world’s population will be living in urban areas (Juncker, 2015). However, 
cities are embedded in institutional hierarchies, framed by structures such as the nation state 
and (in Europe) the EU. As we will discuss in detail later, cities vary widely with regard to their 
activity and strategic choices in climate change policy: some form local networks with industry 
and stakeholders; some collaborate with other cities domestically and internationally; while 
some take a more passive stance. While the EU multilevel governance arrangement to address 
climate change is challenging to navigate for cities, it is also ripe with opportunities for col-
laboration both across the public-private divide and across national and jurisdictional borders 
(Pierre, 2019). 
The policy problem
We mentioned in the introduction that climate change is often understood as a typical “wicked 
problem”: slippery to define; characterized by “strong complexity, uncertainty and ambigu-
ity” (Hustedt, 2014:153), and more or less impossible to address efficiently (Head and Alford, 
2015).
Climate change policies can be divided into two main policy fields; mitigation and adaptation. 
Climate change mitigation policies address in general causes of climate change. Greenhouse gas 
emission reduction is an example of a mitigation policy. Adaptation policies, by contrast, deal 
with preparations for addressing the consequences of global warming, for instance protecting 
coastal cities from flooding. Some adaptation actions have characteristics of a private good 
as benefits of actions may accrue more directly to the individuals, regions, or countries that 
undertake them, at least in the short term. Nevertheless, financing such adaptive activities 
remains an issue, particularly for developing countries (IPCC, 2014).
The EU has taken a high profile in this policy sector. Thus, for 2020, the EU committed itself to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent compared to 1990; in 2030 emissions are sup-
posed to be down to 60 percent; and by 2050 the EU aims to cut emissions by 80-95 percent. 
Furthermore, EU member states need to promote and sponsor renewable energy projects and 
reduce their energy consumption.
The strategy addressed several issues that were identified as main boundaries in the promo-
tion of climate policies. The main issues concerned financial as well as personal resources (Mc-
Callum et al., 2013). The EU has created financial incentives and funding opportunities for 
member states and their cities in order to promote climate change policies. However, most EU 
policies towards environmental protection and climate change are directives, offering member 
states discretion for interpretation in their national policy making. Hence, the outcome of a 
directive differs from one member state to the next.
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Thus, importantly, EU member states maintain their own environmental policies. The imple-
mentation of EU policies depends largely on the good will of the member states and their capac-
ity to coordinate between different levels such as the European, federal and municipal levels.
Embedded in this complex governance system, cities and municipalities find themselves torn 
between serving as agents implementing national obligations on the one hand, and setting 
their own priorities, strategies and objectives on the other (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). In order 
to compensate for their limited formal and legal leverage in this policy field, cities find other 
sources of leverage and capacity act by increasing cooperation within and across national bor-
ders. Over the past 10-15 years, international networks of cities (frequently sponsored by the 
EU) have evolved to help cities build capacity to address the challenge of greenhouse gas emis-
sions (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006). These networks disseminate knowledge and expertise on 
climate change-related issues, outline strategies and formulate policy goals for their members 
(Gore, 2010; Pierre, 2019; Sharp et al., 2011).
Vertical policy coordination in a multilevel governance setting
We will now step back from our empirical analysis for a moment and discuss the broader im-
plications of aligning issues related to vertical policy coordination with multilevel governance, 
which is the predominant mode of governance of environmental policy in the EU.
Multilevel governance of climate change
What we have described so far is a textbook case of multilevel governance in the EU. Our task 
now is to outline a framework which integrates multilevel governance and vertical policy co-
ordination.
The multilevel governance framework allows us to observe how political agency evolves 
through interaction among institutional levels (Bache and Flinders, 2004; Bulkeley and Betsill, 
2005; Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Piattoni, 2010). Multilevel governance in the EU draws to a 
large extent on negotiated relationships between different institutional levels and incentives 
rather than command and control patterns of vertical policy coordination. Equally important, 
the EU version of multilevel governance is essentially non-hierarchical; we see numerous ex-
amples—not least in climate change policy and environmental policy—of the EU Commission 
approaching cities and regions rather than communicating through the capital of the member 
states. This behavior is to a significant extent explained by the limited formal authority that 
the EU has in these policy areas. As a result of those constraints, the EU will support networks 
and offer incentives to subnational governments to address those issues. 
Multi-level governance draws on the notion that “decision making competencies are increas-
ingly shared between actors operating at different levels of governance” (Betsill and Bulke-
ley, 2006:149). Piattoni (2010) points out that multilevel governance fosters an exercise of 
a slightly different form of political authority, which represents a shift from attention to the 
center towards focusing on the periphery; a shift from the national to the international arena; 
and a shift from the public towards the private, bringing in stakeholders and relying on incen-
tives and market mechanisms. Together, these shifts imply an exercise of a contextualized and 
negotiated form of political authority where policies and programs to a large extent are oppor-
tunity structures for subnational agents rather than directives for execution (Peters and Pierre, 
2001, 2004; Pierre, 2019).
This means that as we study vertical policy coordination, we need to not just observe how 
this works domestically but also in relationship to the EU. It also means that while formal 
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chains of command certainly matter, so do softer instruments like incentives or invitations to 
knowledge-based networks. These informal and contextually defined instruments thus oper-
ate alongside formal institutional relationships. And finally, integrating multilevel governance 
and vertical policy coordination, we should be open to a much less hierarchical order of policy 
making and implementation and that ideas and policy concepts can flow not only top-down 
but also bottom-up.
Vertical policy coordination
One of the most salient problems in contemporary government is that of coordinating policies 
and programs in order to boost efficiency, impact and outcomes (O’Flynn et al., 2013; Peters, 
2015). While coordination has always been a challenge to governments, the problem has been 
exacerbated along with growing societal complexity, diffused knowledge and expertise, and 
the increasing saliency of policy problems—national security and safety, pandemics, climate 
change, migration, etc.—that traverse policy sectors and institutional borders.
At the same time, however, governments around the world are still predominantly structured 
according to different policy sectors. There is good reason for this arrangement; while the func-
tional organizational paradigm has proven to be conducive to sectorization, these often deni-
grated “silos” or “stovepipes” do provide for specialization and the accumulation of expertise 
better than any other organizational model (Verhoest and Bouckaert, 2005). Thus, the heart of 
the problem is that the more public institutions become knowledgeable and expert-oriented, 
the bigger the problems in convincing them to team up with institutions in other policy sectors 
and to develop a joint agenda and plan of action. 
The obstacles to working across boundaries are not confined only to the nature of the policy 
problems or growing social complexity. Problems with bending or integrating organizational 
cultures and with defining hierarchies among institutions at the same nominal level of organi-
zation like government departments or executive agencies loom large in processes aimed at 
increasing horizontal coordination. In addition, pooling resources across sectoral borders and 
ensuring accountability are perennial problems in horizontal coordination. As O’Flynn et al. 
(2013) show, the nature of these different problems varies, as do the strategies employed in 
different national contexts to ameliorate them. Arguably, different institutional and constitu-
tional settings to some extent explain this cross-national variation in coordination strategies. 
The literature on policy coordination is, perhaps for obvious reasons, mainly preoccupied with 
horizontal coordination among central government institutions in different policy sectors (Pe-
ters, 2015, 2018). However, there also is a vertical dimension of policy coordination whereby 
central, regional and local government seek to align policies and programs and policy design 
links up with policy implementation (Adam et al., 2019). Also, and most prominently in the 
European context, transnational institutions use economic or regulatory resources to try to 
shape domestic programs, thus adding an additional institutional level to the coordination 
process.
Perhaps the most important challenge to vertical coordination is the extent of autonomy ac-
corded subnational government; the more extensive subnational autonomy, the more complex 
the vertical policy coordination (Adam et al., 2019). If we look specifically at the climate change 
policy sector, vertical policy coordination is essential since, as pointed out earlier, much of 
greenhouse gas emissions occur in cities while formal legal and regulatory authority and finan-
cial resources rest with national institutions. Thus, there needs to be some consistency among 
the three levels in terms of policy targets and measurements (Linander, 2019).
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In the current analysis, we need to consider not just how coordination is achieved; of equal im-
portance is the question of what needs to be coordinated. For instance, is policy coordination 
mainly a matter of harmonizing policy objectives; or does coordination refer to synchronizing 
policy instruments; or is coordination a mechanism to ensure that programs are implemented 
in a similar fashion across the territory? Furthermore, vertical policy coordination is often 
fraught with issues related to how the funding required to implement central government pro-
grams is to be divided between central and subnational government where central government 
frequently relies on “unfunded mandates” to relocate financial responsibilities to the local level 
(Pierre, 2013). Thus, if anything, vertical policy coordination is at least as challenging as hori-
zontal coordination, if not more so. 
Vertical and horizontal policy coordination are closely intertwined processes which cannot be 
fully understood without considering both dimensions of coordination. This is particularly the 
case in jurisdictions with extensive regional or local autonomy. Given that much of the policy 
coordination literature explicitly or implicitly draws on the UK or US experiences—countries 
with very limited local autonomy (Gurr and King, 1987)—the vertical coordination dimension 
has received far less attention. We argue, however, that ensuring that actors and institutions 
at all tiers of government have a shared understanding of policy objectives and instruments is 
just as essential to policy success as horizontal policy coordination at the central government 
level. 
Vertical policy coordination in a multilevel governance context 
The consolidation and continuing integration of the EU presents member-state institutions 
with a new type of challenge. Multilevel governance refers to more than merely adding another 
institutional level to the system of governance (see, for instance, Bache and Flinders, 2004; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Peters and Pierre, 2001; Piattoni, 2010); the interaction between 
institutions at different levels is more negotiated and sometimes even defined ad hoc than 
in more conventional intergovernmental relationships. The case of CO2 emissions reduction 
policy illustrates this issue. 
This contextualization of policy making and implementation has several important conse-
quences. One such consequence is related to the flow of ideas and the location of expertise in 
the system. Cities may experience that nation-state policies have unintended consequences 
when implemented at the local level and seek to communicate those issues to central govern-
ment and help shape future policies. Several studies show the significant role of local gov-
ernment in shaping policy choice and design at the national level (Gustafsson, 1987; Rhodes, 
1986).
Add to this complex picture the EU and the global level and the extent to which policy coordi-
nation in a multi-level governance setting poses a significant challenge becomes even clearer. 
Thus, the vertical coordination of climate change-related policies and programs does not nec-
essarily follow a strict top-down and ordered process; it is as likely to be top-down as bottom-
up, or could evolve through an interactive and iterative process among different institutional 
levels (Torfing et al., 2012). These fluid, ad hoc coordination processes are fertile soil for net-
works connecting agency at different institutional levels where cities and regions cooperate to 
share knowledge and extract resources from higher institutional echelons (Betsill and Bulkeley, 
2006; Pierre, 2019).
We also note that there is a significant undercurrent to the decentralized pattern of environ-
mental policy in the form of court appeals on local governments’ building permits for power 
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plants which are likely to have an environmental impact (Majone, 1997). For example, ad-
ministrative rulings to impose stricter rules on industrial processes potentially damaging the 
environment are sometimes appealed and end up in the court system for a considerable period 
of time. 
Vertical climate change policy coordination in Germany and Sweden
We will now turn to our case studies of vertical policy coordination in Germany and Sweden. 
Germany
Germany is not among the forerunners in environmental protection, at least when it comes to 
the establishment of agencies and policy programs. In 1971, the first Environmental Protec-
tion Program was agreed on and led towards the installment of Germany’s Environment Pro-
tection Agency (Umweltbundesamt), in 1974, following the example of Sweden and the United 
States.
Since 1972, policymaking in the environmental field is mainly carried out by the federal gov-
ernment. Until 2006, the Bundesländer were tasked with the protection of landscapes and na-
ture. As EU policies gained increasing importance, coordination between the different levels 
became more difficult. Since 2006, Länder and municipalities have been in charge of the imple-
mentation, whereas legislation remains with federal institutions. In addition, most German 
Bundesländer have their own environmental protection policies. 
German environmental policies were completely reassessed after the nuclear accident at Fuku-
shima. The so-called Energy Transition (Energiewende) was passed by the CDU/FDP coalition 
in 2011, signifying the shift towards renewable and sustainable energies. Key parts of the pro-
gram are the phase-out of nuclear reactors by 2022 and emissions reductions, which include 
the retirement of the coal-fired power plant generation. The overall goal is to have a sustainable 
energy system in place by 2050. The Energiewende is geared to foster three main policy goals; 
supply security, economic efficiency, and environmental protection. 
Vertical and horizontal climate change policy coordination in Germany is rather complex. Pe-
ters (2018) points out that both types of coordination are particularly important in federal 
systems. Due to the federal structure and the constitutional autonomy of local authorities, five 
levels matter; the global sphere, the EU, the central government, the 16 constituent states, and 
the more than 11,000 municipalities. 
Most climate-change related legislation takes place at the federal level. However, most state 
governments also pursue their own agenda and have their own climate change policies. As a 
result, conflicts occasionally arise when Länder set different priorities than the federal govern-
ment. Such conflicts might, for example, lead to an expansion of renewable energy sources at 
non-optimal locations (Wurster and Köhler, 2016).
The Energy Saving Ordinance (EnEV - Energieeinsparverordnung) established in 2007 is a case in 
point which illustrates the difficulties of vertical coordination and the problematic relationship 
between the federal state, the Länder and municipalities. While the requirements set in 2016 
are reasonable from a climate policy perspective, German energy and climate change policies 
seem to suffer from a coordination deficit due to limited municipal resources such as expertise 
and manpower. Consequently, the degree of implementation differs and individual measures 
at the local level can barely be coordinated (Sahner and Plachta, 2013).
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It is argued that the EnEV ignores local realities and sets standards which are out of reach, since 
it was solely planned at the federal level (Galvin, 2012). The Länder are tasked with monitoring 
their municipalities. However, Hennig (2013) argues that the Länder fulfill their monitoring 
tasks to very different degrees. Overall, the attempt to shift responsibility to the Länder in the 
sense of hierarchical top-down governance illustrates the challenges and pitfalls when it comes 
to multi-level governance. Länder regulations show a big discretion in their interpretation of 
the EnEV (Hennig, 2013). While some federal states “protect” their municipalities from strict 
enforcement of the EnEV, other federal states and municipalities position themselves as pio-
neers, putting pressure on the federal government to force laggards to comply with minimum 
standards. 
Yet, not only the Länder pursue their own agendas; municipalities, too, have their own strate-
gies. The Local Authorities Guideline (Kommunalrichtlinie - KRL) is a support program from the 
Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. It serves as the 
main instrument of the National Climate Initiative (Göpfert, 2014) and focuses on initial ad-
vice, climate action concepts as well as climate action management. Cities can apply for fund-
ing for the position of a climate manager sponsored by the KRL for three years. In addition, the 
ministry has introduced the Masterplan 100% Climate Action, a key characteristic of which is 
the financial support of so-called Masterplan Municipalities (MPK - Masterplan Kommunen). 
Consequently, some cities are forerunners while others are laggards. 
The difference between laggards and forerunners is even more evident when we look at energy 
and CO2 policies at the Länder level. There is a major conflict between those Länder that pro-
duce a significant amount of renewable energy (such as Lower Saxony) and those relying on 
traditional energy production (for instance Baden-Württemberg). The latter seek to protect 
their home industries and fear financial as well as political costs. Consequently, they under-
mine the expansion of electricity grids for the transport of renewable energy from the north 
to the south. Furthermore, resources spent on research programs or funds made available to 
citizens differ from Bundesland to Bundesland, increasing the gap and illustrating difficulties of 
horizontal coordination. Conflicts among the Länder in terms of CO2 reduction related policies 
serve as a case to exemplify tensions in terms of horizontal policy coordination.
Conflicts not only occur among the Länder; there is also tension between the Länder and their 
respective municipalities. Freiburg, for instance, was prevented by its state government when 
it sought to designate areas for wind power plants (Späth and Rohracher, 2011; Galvin, 2012). 
This case illustrates challenges in terms of vertical coordination. So-called ecopoints (Ökopunk-
te) demonstrate a further case that underlines tensions between state governments and their 
respective municipalities. Ecopoints (Maurer and Schader, 2019) should compensate for the 
sealing of areas. For example, farmers converting a field into a meadow can claim ecopoints be-
cause a meadow is “more ecologically valuable” than a field. Municipalities and businesses are 
allowed to sell these points, they can even be found on eBay. The system is criticized as a mod-
ern form of indulgence trade. In Baden-Wurttemberg almost 30 percent of compensation and 
replacement measures were not implemented in 2019, and similar numbers can be found for 
Bavaria and Hesse. A survey among the 16 state governments revealed that most environment 
ministries do not know how many ecopoints are registered or traded in their state. Municipali-
ties and regional governments are supposed to control ecopoints.
Local governments not only engage domestic regional and federal institutions; they also col-
laborate in global, transnational networks. The ICLEI, Energy Cities and the Climate Alliance 
represent the three biggest networks (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009). Much of this collaboration 
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evolved as EU-funded projects, substantiating the multilevel governance of this policy sector 
in Europe. However, most cities participating in those networks are forerunners in the sustain-
ability field, increasing the gap between leaders and laggards. Many local authorities lack nec-
essary resources; for instance, they lack the expertise required to implement and monitor cli-
mate policies and they do not have the financial resources to comply with national legislation. 
All these cases illustrate the poor vertical coordination of climate change policies in Germany. 
Institutional relations easily become tense when environmental issues such as the reduction 
of CO2 emissions come on the agenda. The federal government has no monopoly on setting 
policy objectives; the Länder are also engaged in policy making and their policies may or may 
not correlate with those by the federal government.
Sweden
Sweden embarked comparatively early on public policy to protect the environment. Sweden 
was also among the first countries to create an agency in the environmental policy sector when 
The Environmental Protection Agency [Naturvårdsverket] was created in 1967. This attention 
to the environment was later directed more specifically towards the climate change cluster of 
issues.
Sweden is often described as a forerunner in environmental protection and the promotion of 
sustainable development. While there certainly is some merit to that account there are also 
some specific factors that help explain Sweden’s early commitment to environmental issues. 
First, Sweden has for a long time relied on hydro-electric and nuclear power for its supply of 
electric power. In 2017, hydro-electric power accounted for 40 percent of the total production 
of electric power and nuclear power plants generated another 40 percent. While both of these 
technologies have potential or real impact on the environment, they are both fossil free, hence 
meeting greenhouse emission reduction targets has presented less of a challenge to Sweden 
than for most other countries. 
Secondly, Sweden has pushed climate change-related issues intensively on the international 
stage although the country’s influence on international agreements has been marginal at best. 
Parts of the soft power that the government has tried to muster have been derived not just 
from implementing but also from over-implementing international accords and agreements, 
in an effort to lead by example (Zannakis, 2009).
The vertical coordination of climate change policy in Sweden is complex and fragmented. As 
Linander (2019) shows, central, regional and local governments use different targets for the 
reduction of greenhouse emission reductions and also different measures of such emissions, 
thereby exacerbating policy coordination problems. The Swedish case also highlights the need 
for central government to strike a balance between too much and too little steering and provi-
sion of guidelines to regions and cities. Interestingly, Linander (2019:32-33) shows how cities 
and regions criticize central government for not doing enough in this respect in the climate 
change policy field, stating that “cities are waiting for consistent state steering” (present au-
thors’ translation).
Thus, in vertical policy coordination, as in Spider Man, with great powers come great responsi-
bilities. Sweden’s regions and cities enjoy extensive formal autonomy in relationship to central 
government, yet in greenhouse emissions reduction policy, where central government seeks to 
take command, these autonomous institutions want more steering from the state, not less. We 
mentioned earlier how the divorce between formal jurisdiction on the one hand and proximity 
to both the sources and the solutions to greenhouse gas emission reduction is a major compli-
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cating factor. Deeply aware of this problem, cities and regions in Sweden seem to urge central 
government to take a higher profile on these issues in order to strengthen the vertical policy 
coordination (Linander, 2019).
Central government is, however, not idling on these issues. It employs legislation, regulation, 
and subsidies to drive environmental policies and programs. Overarching legislative frame-
works such as The Environmental Code (miljöbalken) provide the judicial backbone of the envi-
ronmental policy and define the roles of subnational government. The chief role of The Code is 
to set the goal and means of sustainable development. Frequently updated and amended, the 
Code serves as a foundation for regulations issued by the Environmental Protection Agency 
and other agencies. Subnational governments are instructed to develop sustainable plans for 
their physical planning.
Regional government in Sweden (landsting) is predominantly engaged in healthcare. In addi-
tion to subsidies from central government, some 90 percent of regional governments’ budgets 
goes into health care. Swedish regional government has two components. One is the regional 
government based in regional elections producing a regional elected assembly. The other com-
ponent is the regional tier of central government (länsstyrelse), historically referred to as “the 
extended arm of the King”. In the area of environmental policy and climate change-related 
actions, the länsstyrelse plays a more important role as it oversees local governments, engages 
the EU structural funds, and monitors the implementation of central government programs at 
the regional and local levels. 
For the present context we should note that regions are not a very significant environmental 
policy arena. The role of regions in the environmental policy sector is primarily to surveil local 
governments’ implementation of central government policies. This is the common institution-
al arrangement in most unitary states.
Turning now to the local level, Swedish local governments enjoy considerable formal and de 
facto autonomy. While it is true that there has been a growing tendency among central govern-
ment institutions to steer and control local authorities, the pattern that local governments are 
quite autonomous remains true. 
Much of the collaboration between the public and private sector takes place at the local level. 
This is also where the bulk of environmental policy and sustainability programs and policies is 
put into action. These two aspects are closely related. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions and 
developing a “green economy” requires close collaboration between the city and private sector 
research facilities. The city of Gothenburg is a good example, having received a dozen or so in-
ternational awards for its work on environmental, economic and social sustainability, in close 
collaboration with the city’s corporate sector (see Pierre, 2019). 
Moreover, European cities are increasingly networked in the sustainable development policy 
field. The EU’s “smart cities” program supports transnational networks of cities as a means of 
diffusing knowledge and technologies to support a sustainable city. It is safe to say that the 
learning and diffusion of knowledge that takes place in these networks is at least as important 
to local governments as are its contacts with higher echelons of their respective national gov-
ernments. 
All is not well, however. Betsill and Bulkeley (2007:450) argue that there is “a lack of ‘fit’ be-
tween the nature of the problem to be governed and the institutions undertaking governance”. 
This ‘lack of fit’ refers precisely to the disjuncture between issue ownership and political and 
administrative legal leverage. which is the theme of this paper. Similarly, Nilsson et al. (2012) 
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note that the governance of climate change action at the local level is poorly institutionalized. 
Thus, the local governance of climate change-related policies and programs has been conducted 
to a large extent by informal networks and other forms of contextual forms of collaboration be-
tween the local government and actors in their external environment. Some might argue that 
informal networks and partnerships provide better opportunities for innovation than more 
formalized structures of collaboration, but in the longer haul it might be desirable to have a 
higher degree of institutionalization providing a framework for collaborative projects. 
These observations refer to the horizontal governance dimension, i.e. patterns of collaboration 
and exchanges between the local authority and actors in the surrounding society, and less so 
to the vertical dimension of governance and policy coordination. In this latter dimension, as 
we saw earlier, national legislation gives local government a baseline definition of assignments 
but much of the activity in the sustainable development sector should be seen as part of the 
realm of the local authority’s autonomy; how cities relate to the corporate sector or to interna-
tional networks of cities is essentially their own choice.
Comparative analysis
In an ideal intergovernmental relationship arrangement, we would expect lower-level rule-
making to be embedded in upper-level policy objectives and regulatory frameworks. However, 
the autonomy of regional and local government allows subnational institutions to set their 
own objectives which may or may not correlate with national objectives. In other instances, cit-
ies and regions criticize central government for not coordinating sufficiently. Also, subnational 
government may use other measurements on greenhouse gas emissions than those used by 
national government, something which makes any coordinated assessment of environmental 
change very difficult (Linander, 2019).
These observations suggest that the targets of steering, in order to deliver good climate change 
policy, sometimes demand stricter steering in order to boost policy efficiency. The idea that 
the demand for steering sometimes exceeds the supply is not new (see Jacobsson, Pierre and 
Sundström, 2015) but it is nonetheless worth noting as it suggests that cities and regions may 
find their institutional autonomy to be an impediment to policy efficiency.
In both Germany and Sweden, the self-governing mandate grants all municipalities the right 
to “decide all matters relevant to the local community in their own responsibility within the 
frame of existing legislation” (in Germany, the Grundgesetz, article 28, section 2; in Sweden, 
the Instrument of Government, Chapter 1, par. 1 has an almost identical ruling). While this ar-
rangement may vitalize local democracy, it also presents significant hurdles for vertical policy 
coordination and, by extension, for efficient policies to address climate change.
In both countries it is easy to note the tensions between those institutions that own the green-
house emissions reduction issue and those that control the regulatory and financial leverage 
required to execute environmental protection and climate change-related policies and pro-
grams. However, the two countries have chosen somewhat different paths towards strength-
ening the vertical coordination of CO2-reduction policy. In Germany, the complexity and chal-
lenges of multi-level governance become evident when we look at climate change policies more 
broadly. The division into laggards and forerunner municipalities underlines the wickedness 
of the climate change policy sector, highlighting the bargain over power and resources. Since 
municipalities are not only embedded in the federal government structure but also of their re-
spective Land, political interests come into play and have tremendous consequences on policy 
implementations. Thus, Germany serves as a case in point to illustrate the consequences of 
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poorly coordinated policies. Again, cities produce most of the pollution and greenhouse gases, 
and while some cities address this problem by network collaboration to disseminate knowledge 
and help develop new technologies, there are also those that lack the necessary resources and 
expertise.
Meanwhile, in Sweden, which as a unitary state should offer fewer challenges to vertical policy 
coordination, cities and regions argue that occasionally there is a shortage of central govern-
ment control and coordination. Central government has introduced (or in some cases re-intro-
duced) instruments and levers to strengthen its control over cities and regions (Statskontoret, 
2019a). This development can be seen across the full range of policy sectors in which local gov-
ernment is a significant agent in the delivery of services or in the implementation of programs. 
Here, climate change emerges as a cross-cutting issue challenging almost all areas of the local 
authority, urging the city to reach out to the local private sector in order to promote research 
and development in green technologies and also to assist in developing more environmentally 
friendly production processes.
As a result, many cities find themselves in a situation where they have to juggle the complex 
vertical multilevel governance processes against horizontal, collaborative governance to bring 
in businesses and stakeholders into joint projects. Thus, the Swedish case offers interesting 
findings. Intergovernmental relations tend to present challenges more frequently than they 
support CO2 emission policies; goal setting and target setting does not correspond across dif-
ferent institutional levels and the re-empowerment of central government in relationship to 
cities and regions has a lasting impact on policy implementation at the local level. 
Furthermore, both countries substantiate the close relationship between horizontal and verti-
cal policy coordination; poor horizontal policy coordination at the central government level 
creates or exacerbates problems of vertical policy coordination. In Sweden, this phenomenon 
was evident as the 2006-14 central government pursued several large-scale infrastructural pro-
jects, thereby allowing for increasing CO2 emissions, without considering how the new infra-
structures would impact the prospects of reaching the CO2 policy targets (Linander, 2019).
A final observation from this comparative analysis, coming back to a previous point, is that 
the concept “vertical” in a multilevel governance context is not always synonymous with a top-
down model of political and administrative communication but can also refer to more iterative 
and interactive exchanges between levels. In most other policy sectors, “vertical” coordination 
denotes central government instructing regions and cities on how to implements its policies 
and programs. However, the multilevel governance perspective of greenhouse emission reduc-
tion policy suggests that cities, as loci of collaborative public and private ventures to develop 
green technology to reduce emissions, sometimes are transmitters of policy ideas at least as 
much as they are recipients. 
Conclusions
Coordinating public policy across jurisdictional borders and institutional levels has proven to 
be a challenge for central governments for a long time. The novelty that this paper brings to 
the discussion is twofold. First, we show that vertical policy coordination is essentially a two-
way street; ideas and calls for action flow both top-down and bottom-up. Cities’ and regions’ 
demands for more coordination sometimes exceed central government’s provision of such co-
ordination. In the EU multilevel governance of environmental policy, broadly defined, there is 
additional complexity to vertical coordination when EU institutions and domestic subnational 
institutions engage each other directly, bypassing central governments.
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Secondly, the context where cities own issues related to the reduction of greenhouse gas emis-
sions but lack the expertise and resources to address those issues by themselves has proven 
to be a powerful incentive for cities to escape the domestic institutional hierarchy and seek 
collaboration with other cities and also with the local business community. In other words, 
when the vertical supply of resources dries up, many (not all) cities explore horizontal avenues 
to collaboration. This strategy is likely to exacerbate vertical policy coordination problems in 
the future. It is also likely to increase the gap between cities that lead the development towards 
reducing CO2 emissions and the laggards. Thus, there is a vicious circle at work; when vertical 
policy coordination fails, regions and cities often find themselves pitted in horizontal-level 
competition for financial and other resources, something which further exacerbates the verti-
cal policy coordination challenges. 
Such vicious circles can be arrested. Central government has, on occasion, and in extraordinar-
ily challenging circumstances, stepped in and overruled even constitutionally guaranteed local 
government mandates. For instance, in response to a major financial crisis in Sweden in 1991 
and 1992, central government chose to override local governments’ authority to set their own 
tax levels and imposed a cap on local taxes. The decision was justified with reference to the 
economic crisis and the concern that local governments would significantly raise taxes. Also, 
the measure was explicitly short-term. Enforcing national decisions on autonomous cities and 
regions is ultimately a matter of weighing costs against benefits. 
Against this background further research should include more cases with regard to the degree 
of autonomy of local government (Ladner, Keuffer and Baldersheim, 2015), and analyze differ-
ent ways in which central/federal government can control local authorities enjoying different 
degrees of autonomy. One could, for instance, compare a state with a high degree of autonomy 
(Germany or Sweden), a medium degree (the Netherlands) and a low degree (United Kingdom).
The root cause of the complexity of vertical policy coordination is that these issues sit at the 
juncture of two constitutional principles. One is the assertion that central government’s deci-
sions and action should cover the entire realm. The other principle, related to the idea of sub-
sidiarity, states that local (and often also regional) government should be granted some degree 
of autonomy so that it can respond to local demands and needs. In most countries, this ap-
parent contradiction is resolved through a system of either assigning different policy areas to 
different institutional levels, or ensuring that essentially all levels are involved, with functional 
differentiation, in all or most policy areas. In both models, but primarily in the latter model, 
the Parker principle of linking authority to accountability constitutes a significant obstacle to 
vertical policy coordination.
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